"Never before has one been able to sit down and endlessly discuss philosophy with a machine that is, for all intents and purposes, thinking freely"
It's mimicking intelligence, M. A bit if I were to tell you to guess a 4 digit number. There aren't actually an infinite amount of possibilities, but from your perspective it may as well be infinite.
No, it's obviously not conscious. If it were, that would be AGI and you'd had heard about it...because that the next step above ANI.
Query: In a deterministic universe, do you think that free will could exist and, if so, how?
Response: If “free will” means you could have chosen differently in the exact same situation with the exact same past and laws of nature, then in a strictly deterministic universe that kind of free will doesn’t exist. Determinism says: same past + same laws ? same outcome.
But a lot of philosophers think free will can still exist under determinism. This view is called compatibilism. The basic idea is: free will isn’t “magic independence from causation,” it’s the ability to act according to your own reasons, values, and decision-making, without being forced or manipulated.
On that view, you have free will when:
- your choice comes from you (your beliefs, desires, character, reasoning),
- you can think through options and respond to reasons,
- and you’re not being coerced (like someone holding a weapon to your head) or overridden (like brainwashing or a seizure).
Even if your reasons and character were themselves caused by prior events, compatibilists say the choice is still “free” because it flows through your mind in the right way: deliberation, self-control, understanding consequences, etc.
A helpful analogy: a calculator is deterministic, but it still “outputs according to its internal rules.” Humans are far more complex, and our “internal rules” include reflection, imagining futures, weighing goals, and changing habits. Determinism doesn’t remove those processes — it just says they have causes.
So:
- Hard determinists: no free will (in the “could have done otherwise” sense).
- Compatibilists: free will exists as “self-directed action guided by reasons.”
- Libertarians about free will: free will requires some indeterminism (and they argue determinism can’t give what we want).
Query: That's all good and well, but I feel that there's an element to free will which we are not taking into account because we are not able to view/understand the full spectrum of information IE Reality. That being the case what do you think we may be missing?
Response: I think you’re pointing at something important: most “free will vs determinism” debates quietly assume we can describe reality completely (or at least in the right way), and then ask whether “choice” fits inside that description. If our description is missing something big, the conclusion could be off—even if determinism is true at some level.
Here are a few plausible “missing pieces” people suspect we’re not accounting for:
1) The difference between what exists and what we can know (epistemic limits).
Even in a deterministic universe, an agent inside the universe can’t usually access the full state of the universe. You don’t know every neuron, hormone, memory cue, social signal, and micro-cause influencing you—let alone everything outside you. That creates a real kind of openness from the inside: you genuinely have to deliberate because you can’t “read the answer key.” Some philosophers think this matters because “free will” is partly about the lived, decision-making role of uncertainty, not about metaphysical dice-rolls.
2) Levels of explanation might be more real than we treat them.
Physics-level determinism (particles, fields) doesn’t automatically tell you what’s true at the level of persons, reasons, promises, responsibility, meaning. We often act as if only the lowest-level description is “the real one,” and everything else is just story-telling. But many thinkers argue higher-level patterns are genuinely causal: reasons can cause actions the way “software” causes what a computer does, even though software is implemented in electrons. If that’s right, free will may be something that exists at the “agent/reason” level even if the base layer is deterministic.
3) Self-reference: you’re a system that can model itself, and that gets weird.
When you learn “I’m the sort of person who procrastinates,” you can change your environment, habits, and identity around that knowledge. Your beliefs about yourself become part of the causal chain. That reflexive loop (model ? action ? updated model) is not just extra detail; it might be the core of agency. A lot of simplistic determinism arguments ignore that agents don’t just get pushed; they also steer by using representations of the future and of themselves.
4) Computational limits: even if the future is fixed, it may be impossible to compress/predict.
A deterministic system can still be practically unpredictable because predicting it requires simulating it. If a decision depends on running a complex internal “simulation,” there might not be a shortcut that lets you know the outcome without doing the thinking. In that sense, deliberation isn’t pointless theatre—it’s the mechanism that produces the outcome. Some people think free will is tied to being an irreducible “planner” in this way.
5) Time and experience might be a bigger part of the concept than we admit.
From the “outside,” you might picture the whole timeline as laid out. From the “inside,” you experience time as unfolding, with genuine deliberation, regret, resolve, learning. It’s possible we’re missing that “free will” is partly a concept built to fit first-person lived reality, not just third-person physics. If so, arguing only from a “God’s-eye view” might be like trying to explain music by listing air-pressure values.
6) Consciousness itself: we don’t yet know what it is, and it might matter.
This is the big unknown. If consciousness/subjective experience turns out to be more than a byproduct—if it has some kind of role we don’t understand—then current arguments could be incomplete. I can’t claim it does add new causal freedom (that’s speculative), but it’s a fair candidate for “the part of reality we don’t have a full grip on.”
If I had to boil your intuition down: we might be missing that “free will” isn’t a single yes/no property of atoms, but something that emerges when a system (a person) has limited knowledge, can model futures, can model itself, can learn, and can act for reasons in a social/moral world.
Quick check: when you say “free will,” do you mean (a) “I could have done otherwise in the exact same state of the universe,” or (b) “my choice is genuinely mine in a deeper sense,” or (c) “I’m responsible / a real agent”? Different “missing pieces” matter more depending on which one you mean.
...like I said, for all intents and purposes, it's thinking freely.