Wow! The most important pool match in the history of the Rugby World Cup has resulted in a sensational, courageous boilover victory to an embattled, smashed Wales side that came back from a 22 – 12 deficit to win, thanks to a last minute try-line stand, 28 – 25.
Minutes earlier, Wales had launched a back line attack, going wide against a ponderous England defensive line. The replacement back, halfback Lloyd Williams, playing on the wing put in an old-fashioned centering kick for Gareth Davies (what a splendidly historic Welsh rugby name) to gather and score a try that will resound through the valleys throughout the ages.
This try and the conversion from Dan Biggar took the score, somewhat unexpectedly to 25 – 25.
Then in the 75th minute, after a series of Wales-England high kicks and not much chase, Wales was awarded a penalty just inside England’s half and right in front. Moment of truth time.
Biggar is not a noted long range kicker. But his goal-kicking so far had been impeccable. Should he take a chance on a long range shot? Or should he kick for touch and Wales try to force a much closer penalty to kick for goal?
He took the shot. It was a shot that rang around the rugby world. It went over comfortably. Wales 28 – England 25.
Wales, not without some traumas, held on to win. It was England’s first loss at Twickenham in their last nine matches. It was only the third time Wales had defeated England in their last 20 matches at Fortress Twickenham.
This victory to Wales sets up a new most important pool match in Rugby World Cup history when England, now under terrible pressure to survive in the tournament, face the Wallabies at Twickenham. For England this match will be a sudden death, if they lose.
Even if they win, an Australian victory against Wales, depending on its size, will see them on the brink of elimination.
The only sliver of light for England in the engulfing darkness is the fact that in both its matches so far in the tournament the side has gained a bonus point, the first for scoring four tries (the last of them on time) against Fiji and the second, for coming within seven points of Wales.
The Wallabies failed to win a bonus point against Fiji. Michael Hooper had the chance to force a 5m lineout from a penalty or go for goal to put the Wallabies more than two scores ahead of a surging Fiji side. He opted for the penalty.
This decision has been widely praised. And it remains to see how the tournament evolves, with the hindsight that comes from knowledge not available to Hooper, whether it was a correct decision or a decision that was lacking in the sort of ambitious dynamism that wins a World Cup.
I have always believed that teams that win the Webb Ellis trophy invariably come, at some time in the tournament, to a moment of truth which, when surmounted, almost predestines their eventual triumph.
For the Wallabies in the 1991 Rugby World Cup, as an example, the moment of truth came for the Wallabies in their quarter-final against Ireland, when against the run of play Ireland snatched a lead, with time running out, from a sensational break-out, kick and chase try.
It is part of the glorious history of the Wallabies that Michael Lynagh, acting as captain for an injured Nick Farr-Jones, gathered his players together, told them them the tactics required from the kick-off, called the backline movement to set up the winning try, which he scored.
Lynagh turned down the chance of kicking an easy field goal and going into extra time.
This was a successful moment of truth conversion. Did England fail their moment of truth? I believe this is the case.
After Biggar’s successful last penalty, England were faced with scoring a try to win or converting a penalty to draw.
The poisoned chalice of making a decision to resolve this dilemma came with three minutes to play.
A penalty was forced by England just outside the Wales 22.
England captain Chris Robshaw consulted with his kicker, Owen Farrell, who had been impeccable throughout the match with five penalties, a conversion and a field goal.
Possibly with the heroics of Japan’s final winning assault on the Springboks in mind, Robshaw opted for going for the try.
But it was a decision, unlike the Japanese decision which had been demanded by the players, that the England pack did not seem to buy into. Instead of energising England, Robshaw’s decision seemed to deflate his side.
Rather than being focussed and mistake-free, like the Lynagh Wallabies or the Brave Blossoms, England played as if the game had been lost. They showed no energy, no composure. And so they made several crucial mistakes.
The first mistake was a tactical one. Wales double-teamed the England jumpers at the end of the lineout. England took the bait and threw short. This was exactly what Wales wanted them to do. The Wales forwards piled into the maul. They got a shunt on. And shoved the maul and the ball into touch.
Why didn’t England trust its jumpers and go long? This would have opened up both sides of the field from England’s rolling maul.
A poor Wales clearance from their own lineout gave England a second lineout inside the Wales 22. This time England threw to the middle. But the transfer to the halfback was knocked on.
Why didn’t England try to drive this lineout?
There was one more crisis for Wales to negotiate before wrapping up a famous victory. They faced having to clear a scrum, again near their try line.
Let’s remember at this point that the Wales scrum had been under the cosh most of the game. England put on a tremendous shove. The Wales scrum went backwards. The Wales scrum seemed, for an instant in time, rather like a car pushed half-way over a cliff and about to crash to the bottom any time.
Taulupe (Toby) Faletau, a terrific number 8 for Wales, picked up ball, the equivalent of pushing the teteering car back from the brink. A pass to Biggar. And the man of the match (and rightly so) turned and booted the ball “into the shit house,” to quote the immortal cry from Bob Dwyer.
There will be endless reflections on Robshaw’s decision, especially if – as seems probable more than possible – England do not make the finals.
With these matters, the outcome of the decision is the crucial factor. Japan against the Springboks, the Wallabies in 1991 against Ireland, were both justified because they came off. Robshaw’s decision would have been correct, if it, too, had come off.
And if it had come off, England would have gone into the finals with tremendous momentum and (like the 1991 Wallabies) perhaps gone on to win the Webb Ellis trophy.
In my view, the problem with Robshaw’s decision was that it did not fit the psychology of English rugby. I am not having a go at England rugby here. This is an explanation, not a criticism. The key driving imperative of England sides, with their bully boy forwards and big, hard-shoulderd and slowish centres, is the attritional game.
Admittedly, England scored a wonderful ensemble try from a lineout and quick hands and slick running lines in the backs before Jonny May scuttled away brilliantly for a try under the posts.
But this is the icing on the cake for England. The cake itself is a whole grain concoction. You can see this, in rugby terms, in the statistics. England ran or smashed 431m to the 369m of Wales. But only 91 passes were made to the 104 passes of Wales.
When England were leading 25 – 18 going into the last 10 minutes, Sam Burgess was subbed and replaced by George Ford, with Farrell going to inside centre. Rather than using Ford as a runner, Farrell kicked and even Mike Brown, England’s most dynamic runner, kicked.
The irony here is that Ford had been the number 10 in the 2015 Six Nations who had inspired a record 18 tries for England.
But when the crunch came, England reverted to type, the kicking game. Why? Because, like the Springboks this is the game they are comfortable with playing.
As David Campese famously said after the 1991 Rugby World Cup final, when England adopted a running game instead of their successful bully boy game and lost narrowly, “you can’t learn to run the ball in five minutes.”
You also have to be confident about your skills and enthusiasm for the running and handling game to pull off a victory using this game against a ferocious defence.
Wales, if they get past Fiji, are in the box seat to go through to the finals. They play the Wallabies at Twickenham, with referee Craig Joubert doing the honours. Their loose forwards, especially when Justin Tupuric came on to join captain Sam Warburton and Faletau, were too fast and aggressive on the ball for the lumbering England trio.
Wales have lost 10 successive Tests to the Wallabies. Before the tournament everyone, including Sir Ian McGeechan, picked the Wallabies to continue this dominance. Perhaps we need to remember that the heart and soul of this Wales side was the young side that was only a Sam Warburton red card away from playing the All Blacks in the 2011 Rugby World Cup final.
England have big selectorial problems going into their match against the Wallabies. Fiji and Wales both won numerous turnovers against England’s ponderous back row. I’ve argued this before, that Robshaw is not agile enough or quick enough to be a number 7.
Tom Wood or Robshaw should be number 6 and at 7, who knows. England rugby, except for Neil Back, does not throw up New Zealand/Australian fast, athletic, abrasive, ball-winning number 7s.
You would think that the Wallabies will play David Pocock and Michael Hooper, again, in the starting squad. England will struggle to contain these two at the rucks.
In the past, England have toughed over this weakness of lack of speed in their pack (the exception was Sir Clive Woodward’s successful 2003 squad with the great Neil Back!) by dominating opponents with sheer power in their forward game. This power was matched, too, with exceptional skill in clearing out rucks, dominating scrums and lineouts.
England’s game is lacking these supreme qualities right now.
There is also a problem with the backs. Playing Sam Burgess and Brad Barritt in the centers gave England a pairing that could easily have played on the side of the scrum for England. Initially, too, for the first 60 minutes, the press defence from this pairing created what Jamie Roberts, the great Welsh centre, called an immovable brick wall when England was on defence.
This was the power and the glory for England for an hour.
But Wales, finally, found the room to get outside this brick wall. Although the Wales attacks were launched from well behind the advantage line, generally a no-no, the length of the passing and the restricted England defence wall (and some tiredness, perhaps) allowed Wales to make gains down the wide channels.
England just could not cope, in the end, with these wide attacks.
The point about the press/rush defence is that it is a strict liability tactic. If it works, it works and the attack is effectively shut down. This is what happened for 60 minutes. But, like the football off-side trap, if the press/rush defence fails, even once, it is generally fatal.
It is, therefore, a high-risk tactic. Can England use it against the Wallabies who have a much better passing game than Wales?
If England, say, drop either Barritt or Burgess, or both, the Wallabies can use Matt Giteau and not worry too much about the punishment he will take from trying to stop them. Giteau, for his part, will be valuable in moving the ball to the wide channels where England, with slow centres (presumably) and slow loose forwards (certainly) can be exposed, as they were by Wales.
Aside from draw, which Rod Kafer was touting during the match, as some Wallabies would welcome, this result was great for the Wallabies. England are now one defeat from elimination from the tournament. If the Wallabies can achieve this, they are virtually assured of making the finals.
More importantly, England Fortress Twickenham has been smashed down.
A fearless prediction: the Wallabies to beat England next weekend at Twickenham.
