To be more
precise is important to do a bit of research and analysis into the
justification of the dropping of Small Boy (10000 lb uranium gun-type bomb
which had the equivalent power of 15 kilotons of 15000tons of TNT on Hiroshima
in the first place. The city of Hiroshima had a population 300,000 civilians at
the time. There was a military base there as well granted, but it’s size was
43000 soldiers in full capacity. It was the base for Japanese Second Army but
it is highly unlikely that there were full at this time as the bulk were
deployed elsewhere mainly in Manchuria and the islands just off. When the B.29
dropped the bomb at 30,000ft at 8.15 am the city was full of activity whilst
some of the Japanese Second Army were doing calisthenics
Secondly,
the dropping of the 2nd bomb , named Fat Man on Nagasaki was not
justified at all because no military there. This tactic it was argued was to demoralize
the Japanese and also I believe to create a deviation or red-herring to the
fact that the Red Army was advancing with huge success Japanese soldiers, being
obliterated and surrendering. President Truman was wary of that, as he did not
trust Stalin and Russians, unlike his predecessor Roosevelt. He did not want
the credit to go to them, as there were betrayal plans ahead and on the cards, initiated
by Churchill, ie Operation Unthinkable. It is very doubtful that Roosevelt knew
of this on his deathbed as historians have pointed out as he and Stalin
respected and strangely got on well. It is suggested that the go ahead to
implicate them with done by Roosevelt’s subordinates as they realized he was
dying .
My take is
that neither was justified when actual circumstances were purposely
obscured.
Rather this …
Waiting for
the Soviets. The planned US invasion of the Japanese homeland, Operation
Downfall, was not scheduled to take place until early November 1945. So, in
principle, there was no great rush to drop the bombs in early August. The
Americans knew that the Soviet Union had, at their earlier encouragement,
agreed to renounce their Neutrality Pact with the Japanese and declare war,
invading first through Manchuria. Stalin indicated to Truman this would happen
around August 15th, to which Truman noted in his diary, “Fini Japs when that
comes about.” Aside from cutting Japan off from its last bastion of resources,
the notion of possibly being divided into distinct Allied zones of influence,
as had been Germany, would possibly be more of a direct existential threat than
any damage the Americans would inflict. And, in fact, we do now know that the
Soviet invasion may have weighed as heavily on the Japanese high command as did
the atomic bombings, if not more so. So
why didn’t Truman wait? The official reason given after the fact was that
any delay whatsoever would be interpreted as wasting time, and American lives,
once the atomic bomb was available. But it
may also have been because Truman, and especially his Secretary of State,
Byrnes, may have hoped that the war might have ended before the Soviets had
entered. The Soviets had been
promised several concessions, including the island of Sakhalin and the Kuril
Islands (giving them unimpeded access to the Pacific Ocean) for their entry in
the war, but by late July 1945, the Americans were having second thoughts. As
it was, once Stalin saw that Hiroshima did not provoke an immediate response
from the Japanese, he had his marshals accelerate the invasion plans, invading
Manchuria just after midnight, the morning of the Nagasaki bombing.
What should
we make of these “alternatives”? Not, necessarily, that those in the past
should have been clairvoyant. Or that their concerns were ours: like it or not,
those involved in these choices certainly ranked Japanese civilian lives lower
than those of American soldiers, as is typical in war. None of the
“alternatives” come with any confidence, even today, much less for those at the
time, and those making the choices were working with the requirements,
uncertainties, and biases inherent to their historical and political positions.
But by pointing
out the alternative that were on the table, one can see the areas of choice and
discretion, the different directions
that history might have gone — perhaps for better, perhaps for worse. We should see this history less as a static
set of “inevitable” events, or of “easy” choices, but as a more subtle
collection of options, motivations, and possible outcomes.