Fack checking DA's comments. The evidence appears to suggest Iran stopped most of its nuclear weapons activity around 2003, and that it was not continuing during the Obama led deal
Parts of your comment are broadly aligned with what open sources say, and parts are overstated.
1. Did Iran have a nuclear weapons program?
Yes. Evidence from the IAEA and the 2018 archive supports that Iran ran a structured weapons program (often called the AMAD Project) mainly before 2003, and preserved that know?how.
Key points:
- The stolen archive in 2018 contained tens of thousands of pages and files about warhead designs, fitting nuclear devices to missiles, test setups (including at Parchin), and other weaponization work.
- The IAEA’s long investigation concluded there had been “a variety of activities” relevant to developing a nuclear device up to the early 2000s, with some activities continuing until about 2009, but no ongoing structured weapons program after that.?
So your description of the archive and of Iran having lied for years about never pursuing weapons is grounded in documented evidence, though the details (dates, extent) are more nuanced than “until 2003 and then nothing.”
2. Do we know if Iran has decided to build a bomb now?
On this point, your opening statement is essentially correct and matches current Western intelligence: we do not know Iran has decided to build a weapon.
- U.S. and allied assessments still say Iran has not made a definitive political decision to cross the line and actually manufacture a bomb, even though it has the technical capacity and enriched uranium needed to do so relatively quickly.
- This judgment is consistent with older U.S. National Intelligence Estimates that said Iran halted its organized weapons program in 2003, while keeping options open.?
So saying “we have absolutely no idea if Iran would ever build a nuclear bomb” is too strong – experts think Iran is keeping the option open – but we indeed lack firm evidence of a final decision to build and deploy weapons.
3. Would “the West probably know” and be able to intervene?
Here the situation is mixed. It is not as binary as “of course they would know” or “they’d be totally in the dark.”
What supports “we’d likely know”:
- A bomb requires not just higher enrichment but weaponization steps (converting material into cores, testing detonators and explosive lenses, integrating with delivery systems) that produce signatures intelligence services and the IAEA try to detect.
- Past activity (Fordow, Parchin, covert facilities) has been exposed via satellites, human sources, and IAEA investigations, even when Iran tried to hide it.
What undermines “we’d know in time and could easily intervene”:
- Iran has already restricted IAEA access and monitoring; the IAEA chief has said openly that the agency cannot guarantee the program is purely peaceful because Iran is not fully cooperating and man?made uranium traces were found at undeclared sites.?
- Intelligence is fallible; U.S. and Israeli estimates about how “close” Iran is have varied and often erred on the side of assuming Iran is nearer to a bomb than later evidence showed.?
- A crash, clandestine weaponization effort in parallel with a declared civilian program would be much harder to detect quickly, especially if Iran expelled inspectors in a crisis.
So: the claim “the West would probably know something was happening” is plausible, but “would know enough, early enough, to reliably stop it” is not assured and is treated as a serious risk by most governments.
4. How “naive” is it to rely on inspections and deals?
Your skepticism about trusting a state that has previously lied is understandable, but arms control is designed precisely for adversaries you do not trust.
- The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), before the U.S. withdrawal, significantly rolled back Iran’s enrichment and imposed intensive verification, including continuous surveillance at key sites, and experts broadly judged it was working at that time to lengthen Iran’s “breakout time.”??
- The archive shows Iran preserved weapons knowledge and hid documents from inspectors even after the deal, which is exactly why many experts said the deal had to be combined with very intrusive inspections and other pressure, not blind trust.
So it is naive to rely on Iran’s word; it is not naive per se to use verification?heavy agreements as a way to constrain and monitor a hostile state you assume will cheat if it can.??
5. Bottom line on your fact claims
- “Iran secretly pursued a nuclear weapons program and archived the plans”: Supported by the IAEA’s findings and the Mossad archive.
- “They were actively pursuing weapons until 2003 and then archived everything”: Essentially right on the 2003 halt for the organized program, but evidence shows some related activities continued until around 2009.
- “We have absolutely no idea whether they’d decide to build a bomb”: Overstated; we know they have not yet made that decision, but are closer in capability and keeping the option open.
- “The West would never know the full extent of their ambitions or progress”: It will never know everything, but it does have significant insight, though with real blind spots and uncertainty; neither total ignorance nor total visibility is accurate.
- “Any ‘honourable’ deal is impossible because Iran is dishonest”: That is a political and moral judgment, not a factual claim; factually, deals have constrained Iran’s program when in force but have not removed the underlying knowledge or intent to keep options open.??
If you want, I can walk through what “breakout,” “sneak?out,” and “weaponization” mean in practical terms for Iran’s capabilities, and what kinds of signals would likely show up if Tehran did move toward an actual bomb.